The Master Liquidity Enhancement Con (duit)


In a stunning editorial leap of faith, the New York Times headlines that “3 Major Banks Offer Plan to Calm Debts in Housing.” What three major banks have actually suggested, with Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson safely in tow, is that someone else sail in to save their considerably-at-risk bacon.

Bushpaulson
In a stunning editorial leap of faith, the New York Times headlines that “3 Major Banks Offer Plan to Calm Debts in Housing.” What three major banks have actually suggested, with Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson safely in tow, is that someone else sail in to save their considerably-at-risk bacon.

Paulson, to his credit, is able to announce the laughably named Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit
without so much as the hint of a smile. Not even a little smirk at the
corner of the lip. Hank is not a fan of irony, nor does he much embrace
nuance. Liquidity enhancement is, in this master-stroke of name over content,
a fund to keep a bunch of banks from losing their collective asses on
bad loans they made. Loans dashed off, knowing full well they weren’t
worth anything and had little chance of being paid. Greed was the
engine of their penmanship, pure greed.

(Floyd
Norris, NYTimes) The biggest banks in the United States, with active
encouragement from the Treasury Department, unveiled a plan yesterday
to keep the housing-related debt crisis from worsening.

The
plan calls for the banks to create a new financing vehicle to try to
restore confidence and reduce the risk of a market meltdown by propping
up an important part of the debt markets. But the banks hope to take
minimal risk and avoid actually investing any of their own money.

Subprimelenders
Define crisis and define worsening. Lending institutions are paying the price for their collective failure of integrity and due diligence in offering loans. The crisis that is worsening is nothing more than a healthy market punishing the greedy. Happens all the time, Hank.

This plan, this con(duit) against the public interest, consists of a new financing vehicle.
They call it a vehicle because it drives away with your money. The last
vehicle these greedy characters came up with, drove off with enormous
profits derived from sales commissions, finders’ fees, plus rake-offs
for each slice and dice of the slicing and dicing that offloaded what
has traditionally been mortgage-banker risk.

Usedcarsalesman
Mortgage bankers used to hold mortgages. My old daddy knew his banker,
the guy who underwrote his mortgage, for thirty-five years. No more.
They essentially reincarnated themselves as used-car salesmen.

The used car they foisted off on those unsuspecting souls with poor credit, is now a smoking ruin at the side of the road.

It’s
the image of a market in the healthy process of purging its excesses
and there’s pain involved as there must be in every market correction.

Oldcar
I would caution Henry Paulson that a market saved from itself is no
market at all, but a scam. They sold and profited from the sale of this
smoking roadside wreck. Now that they have to repossess instead of pass
off the liability, it’s suddenly a worsening crisis. They beg now to be able to exchange the smoking vehicle for a new vehicle.

If
the banks’ initiative works as planned, many investors that helped to
finance risky loans — including supposedly safe money market funds —
will be spared distress. And the banks will collect fees for little
more than promising to make loans if no one else will.

Mortgage_2
Initiative. Spared distress
. This bank scam is actually defended because of its supposed ability to spare distress. To the poor folks losing their homes? Not on your life. Surely not to the slicers and dicers—tell
me it isn’t to save the butts of the slicers and dicers, many of whom
take home $100 million incomes, taxed at half the rate you and I happen
to pay. Tell me it’s not them.

It’s them.

The new entity, called a Master
Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, or M-LEC, could raise as much as $200
billion or more through the issuance of its own securities, and use the
money to buy securities that otherwise might be dumped on the market.

The
announcement by Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America came on
the same day that Citigroup reported a sharp fall in third-quarter
profits, with write-offs on troubled securities that were substantially
larger than it had forecast just two weeks ago. Other financial
institutions, including Merrill Lynch, have also had to take
substantial write-offs.

The perfect scam. A way to get at another $200 billion. Not their $200 billion, but someone’s $200 billion to buy the smoking wrecks they left littered along America’s highways, so they won’t have to do it. A conduit;
(noun) a passage, pipe or tunnel through which water or electric wires
(or money) can pass. I guess we know whose liquidity it is that Paulson
and Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America would enhance.

Bushpaulson_2
This being the Bush administration, there is a very good chance these
looters who got caught with their hands in the till will be allowed to
offload what few losses they were too busy to transfer. The slicing and
dicing machine sent most of their risk on down the pipeline (conduit?).

But when the mortgage market collapsed, they still had a couple
hundred billion unstuffed into the sausage grinder—not yet offloaded.
It’s that part—still their part—that they don’t want ‘dumped on the market.’

“I
don’t really see that this is going to make a significant difference,”
said Jan Hatzius, chief United States economist at Goldman Sachs. “It
seems a little more like a P.R. move, frankly.” Mr. Hatzius said he
wondered “why this is going on when previously the official word was
that things were getting better.”

Sheepshearing
With guys like Hatzius palming themselves off as economists with firms as prestigious as Goldman Sachs taking their cue from ‘official word,’
one can readily understand why the sheep have not been better shielded
from shearing. And this has been a massive shearing. A clipping that
victimized economic groups formerly protected from Wall Street avarice by the very fact they had nothing.

  • No assets,
  • No substantial source of income,
  • No credit history upon which
  • To value them as sheep.

Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America (among others) invented a way to steal money these people didn’t even have. A breakthrough metaphor; the John Dillingers of Wall Street finally find a way to rob banks that had already gone broke. Who would ever believe that the American creattive mind would figure out a way to take from those who don’t have?

Shearing naked sheep—the new paradigm.

Subprime
They did it by approving loans. That’s the whole scam—approving loans. Once you have approved a loan, whole new worlds of avarice become visible. New fees (by the tens and twenties) are available to be taken from the loan itself, before the proceeds are dispersed. A way, when there is no wool, to shear the wool that may be there some time in the future, if things don’t come undone. There are sales fees, broker fees, management fees, slice fees, dice fees—all of them available now—ka-ching! Fees on hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars.

Need didn’t drive this bubble, it was greed behind the wheel.

The
market upheaval that took hold in July arose from securities that were
supposed to be safe — and were certified as such by bond rating
agencies — even though they financed risky mortgages. Those securities
would not default unless a large portion of the underlying loans went
bad, and that was deemed unlikely. But in the wake of the subprime
mortgage crisis, questions have arisen about whether the rating
agencies were too optimistic.

Alangreenspan
I can answer that definitively—they were not.
They were way, way too greedy, but excessive optimism was not their
problem. Even Alan Greenspan saw this one coming through his
historically blurry Coke-bottle lenses. The real tip-off to further
manipulation circles what a bad idea Alan thinks the Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit will be for the freedom of the market.

(Emerging
Markets Magazine ) Mr. Greenspan said, “If you believe some form of
artificial non-market force is propping up the market,” he said, “you
don’t believe the market price has exhausted itself.”

Translation; let the market work.

There is (for me) a parallel between the recent mis-management of financial markets and the past fifty years of Forestry Service
mis-management of public lands. For decades, the Smokie-Bears prevented
small fires. There were watch-towers and firefighters perched to pounce
on any campfire gone bad. The result was an unnatural buildup of
combustible material in the nation’s wild areas; pine needles and dead
branches, leaves and blow-downs that had been consumed in less managed
times by small, quick-moving fires.

Yellowstonefire
Not having sufficient bio-mass, these earlier fires moved quickly, died
out quickly and seldom killed the forests through which they raced. The
new and better process of no fire tolerance was disproved in the 1988
Yellowstone Fire, when a third of the park was virtually turned to
glass.

Paulson and his self-serving banks are trying to pursue a no-fire rule in the forests of the economic marketplace, conserving

  • an underbrush of indebtedness forgiveness,
  • a litter buildup of risk avoidance and
  • a massive tinderbox of deferred accountability.

There is likely to be a hell of a fire when the lightning finally strikes.
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